States in the pre-World War I era in an attempt to shed light on their inforrnational characteristics and on their generating mechanisms. In particular, the paper addresses the questions of (1) whether there are variables that reveal conditions conducive to crises, (2) whether financial crises were forecastable on the basis of the information set available to agents, and (3) whether they were alike, in the sense that a set of statistical relationships was common to all episodes.
Jevons (1884, p. 8) presents a related but independent argument. He claims that unexpected events occurring in conjunction with a predictable seasonal pattern in financial variables strained the system to such an extent that public confidence in the banking system waned. This argument seems particularly well suited to explain the European and Canadian experiences where the presence of a Central Bank providing a seasonally elastic supply of currency was not sufficient to prevent the explosion of financial crises. Canova (1991) shows that Jevons' hypothesis also has some merit in accounting for crises in the United States. I find that unexpected changes in the world arena often produced a disruption of the regular (seasonal) flow of specie and credits to the United States from Europe and that these disruptions preceded by a few months and were statistically prior to the explosion of many crises. I interpret the decreased occurrence of financial crises in the post-1914 era as the result of the Fed standing ready to provide liquidity to the system at times when international markets failed to do so.
Several The firms' increased demand for funds to meet payments on debts is typically met by an increase in the outstanding amount of commercial loans. A crisis explodes when the deterioration of the financial position of several firms and their reduced outlook for future profitability cause creditors to reevaluate the amount of credit to be issued, to refuse to extend additional credit and, in the extreme, to actively seek the liquidation of existing outstanding loans. The inability of firms to refinance debt forces them to liquidate assets and induces a multiplicative contraction in business profits. When this distress selling is widespread, asset markets crash and bankruptcies ensue.
Early proponents of this theory all indicate the presence of a psychological ele-ment associated with financial crises (a sudden panic developing from the scramble for liquidity) but they do not agree on its timing. For example, Mitchell sees a panic arising when the process of liquidation of outstanding credit reaches weak links of the system and the bankruptcy of large enterprises spreads unreasonable alarm. Minsky sees a panic appearing after asset prices have sharply dropped. Others identify the scramble with the intense demand for money to meet payments arising from an abrupt cessation of credit. All authors, however, seem to concur that the abnormal decrease in bank deposits associated with a run follows the appearance of a crisis rather than precedes it. The process of learning about a shift in the underlying distribution of possible outcomes repeatedly appeared in early writings (see New York Press (1857, p. 1), and Thom and Thom (1915, p. 2)), and is at the heart of the explanation of crises provided in Meltzer (1982) and by the modern asymmetric information theory of panics (see, for example, Calomiris and Gorton 1991). The basic idea of the latter (see, for example, Chari and Jagannathan 1988 or Gorton 1989) is that in an environment with asymmetric information, a particular class of agents (bank depositors or banks themselves) may receive information leading them to reassess the risk of their investments without knowing which particular economic unit is most likely to be affected by the news. A phase of credit crunch by banks serves the positive effect of their monitoring firm managers to sort out who is insolvent and who is not. Similarly, a banking panic serves to monitor bank performance when banks are involved in the production of nonmarketable assets which are difficult to value. In both cases, the rational revision of beliefs occurs after new information accrues to agents in the economy. However, since only negative shocks are likely to start this revision process, implicit in this hypothesis is the idea that agents react asymmetrically over the business cycle making credit crunches (or bank panics) more likely to occur around the end of an expansion or the beginning of a contraction.
The third theory presented by Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 311) and Cagan (1960, p. 226) emphasizes the role of contractions in the money stock in triggering a forced liquidation of assets by commercial banks. They claim that runs on banks and the inability to expand the stock of money sufficiently to compensate for the drop in bank reserves greatly intensified contractions and set off crises. The nonbanking public's switch from deposits to currency was thought to be the result of either a prior contraction in the money stock or of a change in the public's confidence in banks' ability to convert deposits into currency. l The forced liquidations of banks' assets produced severe drops in asset prices, raised interest rates, and threatened banks' solvency. When this process was accompanied by the failure of prominent financial institutions or railroads, confidence plunged even further transforming a stringency into a crisis. Since the volume of deposits converted into currency and the demand for liquidity was large especially at planting and harvesting times and when (negative) shocks changed the perception of the riskiness of bank deposits, this theory also implies that financial crises were more likely to occur during the 1. Although it is never explicit in the work of Friedman and Schwartz, Calomiris and Gorton (1991) suggest that real shocks may be the cause of the erosion of public's trust in the banking system. agricultural cycle and during business cycle contractions. However, contrary to the previous two explanations, this theory attributes a special causal role to banking panics in the generation of financial crises.
Finally, a recent hypothesis proposed by Wilson, Sylla, and Jones ( 1990) and partially examined by Schwert (1989) suggests a connection between stock market volatility and crises where stock market crashes precede and induce banking panics and recessions. Their line of argument is that because of a bubble, volatility in the stock market is higher than normal and the demand for credit to finance stock speculation soars, pushing short-term interest rates up. Stock speculation is unrelated to fundamentals and builds its momentum in the steady rise of stock prices. When the bubble bursts or runs against other constraints and when the insolvency of those banks that finance the speculation becomes publicly known, the call rate skyrockets, security prices tumble and banks are run. Thus, it is the breakdown of the allocation mechanism of financial capital that causes contractions in business activities and leads to a recession.
Each of the four theories presented has implications for the timing of the occurrence of a crisis. According to the seasonal-based theory of crises, the probability of a crisis was high either (i) when the number of bank clearings was seasonally high or the level of excess reserves relative to the 25 percent boundary in New York banks was seasonally low, or (ii) when unexpected shocks (domestic or international) occurred in conjunction with a regular seasonal drain of currency out of New York. An indicator of unexpected shocks in the system is the size of unexpected declines in excess reserves of New York banks. An indicator of the importance of international factors in generating domestic crises is the spread between short-term interest rates in the IJnited States and in England. A large negative excess reserve shock or a large negative spread at times when seasonal demand for currency was high would make crises more likely to occur.
The credit-business cycle theory, on the other hand, suggests that a high degree of leverage combined with low business profits or a large spread between domestic short-term and long-term interest rates should unveil a situation when the probability of crises was high. In its modern version it suggests that cyclical indicators should help to discern when crises are more likely to occur. The monetary theory of crises predicts that contractions (both expected and unexpected) in the money stock as well as unexpected drops in the deposit-to-currency (D/C) ratio reveal economic conditions conducive to crises. Finally, the bubble theory of crises indicates that abnormal volatility in stock returns occurring in conjunction with high volatility in the spread between short-term and long-term interest rates is a leading indicator for situations of high probability of crises.
Since all these variables belonged to agents' information set, they should have been able to determine when the probability of crises was high. In addition, those hypotheses that indicate that crises are more likely to occur during a particular phase of the seasonal or the business cycle suggest that a high probability of crisis must be predictable on the basis of seasonal or cyclical indicators. Finally, if the same generating mechanism was at work in each episode, no crisis should be better predicted than the others using the available information. The rest of the paper is devoted to verifying all these conjectures.
THE DATA
The data available for the National Banking Era (1864-1914) is heterogeneous and less than satisfactory in several respects. First, most financial series measure monthly averages, or averages over the last week of the month or even averages of the high and low for a month. This creates aggregation problems similar to those discussed by Working (1960) . Second, the monetary aggregates reported in the traditional sources undergo substantial definitional changes over the period under consideration. Third, many variables that could be used to gauge the state of "fundamentals" or of the business cycle are available only at a quarterly or yearly frequency (for example, the business failure series). Therefore, determining the merits of the credit-business cycle theory, in particular, requires the use of debatable proxy .
. .
ndlcators.
I have compiled monthly series, attempting to assemble the highest quality data available under the same definition. I chose a monthly frequency for two reasons. First, monthly data are continuously available for the 1880-1914 period. Second, a month is not too large a time span when compared with the length of a typical crisis. Also, because the quality of the data deteriorates substantially before 1880, I decided to concentrate the analysis on the 1880-1914 period.
U.S. interest rate data is taken from Macaulay (1938) and measures monthly averages of daily figures. The call money rate is the renewal rate at the NYSE desk and refers to loans made for an indefinite period of time subject to recalls with twentyfour-hours notice and requiring collateral to be deposited at the bank issuing the loan. Since renewal rates tend to be less volatile than the new rates, this series is not necessarily a good indicator of the true market conditions. The bond rate measures monthly averages of daily rates for an index of high-quality debt instruments with maturities of twenty years or more. The bonds included in the index and their maturities vary over time but the high quality of the instruments remains throughout the sample. The commercial paper rate is the average rate on "choice 60-90-day twoname paper" and pertains to high quality short-term promissory notes.2 Data on pig iron production, used here as a proxy for cyclical indicators, also comes from Macaulay and measures daily averages in thousands of gross tons.
There are several sources for stock price data. Macaulay provides monthly averages of daily figures for the index number of the prices of railroad stocks weighted by the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. However, the stock market data he reports for the period 1914,8-1914,11 is dubious because the stock market was closed during that period. Cowles (1939) provides a monthly average of the high and low of a value-weighted index of the prices of all stocks actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange and monthly averages of value-weighted sectorial price indices (including railroad, industrial, and steel stocks). Finally, Dow Jones provides a daily price-weighted index of stock prices from 1889 to 1915. Data from 1889 to 1895 includes eighteen railroads and two industrial stocks, while data after 1895 reports the average price of twenty railroad stocks. I sampled Dow Jones data at the end of the month to construct the corresponding monthly series. Dow Jones also provides a daily series on the trading volume of the New York Stock Exchange. However, since this series starts only in 1897, it cannot be used to gauge the volatility of the market in the earlier periods.
Additional information on the performance of individual stocks included in various indices and on the state of fundamentals in the economy is hard to obtain. Priceearning ratios, dividends, and profits of the firms are available only at a yearly frequency. The only indicators of the profitability of firms that are available at a monthly frequency are the "Yield Expectations" series constructed by Cowles. These series measure the expected annual income (estimated each month) per dollar of security value for various market portfolios. The expected annual income is computed as the product of the quantity of stock outstanding and four times the quarterly rate last declared, unless the corporation announced that a change in the rate was going to be made or extra dividends were going to be paid, in which case the rate was adjusted accordingly.
Time series There are two reasons for these chronological differences. First, some crises lasted more than a month and the literature disagrees on the events precipitating crises. Second, some crises occurred between two months and it is difficult to pin down the starting date. To avoid spurious results due to a misspecification of starting dates, I generate two dummy series and examine the evidence with each of them. In the first (denoted by Yl,), I assign a one to the month when a crisis starts according to the earliest data reported and a zero otherwise. In the other (denoted by Y2,), I assign a one to the months when a crises was in progress and a zero otherwise. The two series differ primarily in the 1907 and 1914 episodes, since these crises lasted three and five months, respectively.
There is also some disagreement on which episode should really be considered a crisis. Sprague (1910) The number of incorrect cases reports how many times the model fails to predict with at least 50 percent probability the events that actually occur. Therefore it roughly measures the performance of the models when a 50 percent cut-off probability rule is used. A concentration of incorrect cases at crisis dates indicates a substantial failure of the model.
The last two statistics (Type I and II errors) measure, respectively and on average, probability of a crisis not occurring when it actually did occur (average conditional probability of missing the signal) and the probability of a crisis occurring when a crisis did not occur (average conditional probability of a false alarm). Finally, the plots of recursive probability have a simple and intuitive interpretation: if the model forecasts appropriately, the time series plotted should always be close to 1. A value close to zero at some t indicates the presence of an event not captured by the model (outlier). A clustering of outliers at crisis dates suggest that the model is poor in forecasting crises. Table I Schwert (1989) ]. Finally, model 5 presents the performance of a "naive" forecasting model, that is, a model which assigns a zero probability to a crisis event at all t. This model, which is the analog of a random NOTES: QPS is the Brier quadratic probability score, GBS is the global calibration score, AL is the (geometric) average likelihood, Incorrect cases giv occurred with less than .5 probability, type I is the average probability of a false alarm, type II is the average probability of missing the signal. t-statisti long term railroad bonds and the commercial paper rate. Spread2 is the difference between the U.S. call rate and the U. Table I and in Figure 1 indicate that the agriculturalseasonal hypothesis, the credit-business cycle hypothesis and the monetary hypothesis are all unsuccessful in predicting crises. Abnormally high stock returns three months ahead and unexpected movements in the money supply or in cash reserves two months ahead have some explanatory power for the probability of crisis but they do not predict future events with sufficient precision. The overall fit of these three models, as measured by QPS GBS, and AL, is reasonable. Model 3 is slightly supenor when the first crisis series is used while the perforrnance is more mixed when 1'5t' FABIO CANOVA : 117 the second crisis series is used. This reasonable forecasting performance is, however, entirely concentrated at noncrisis dates. While the probability of a false alarm is very small (2-3 percent), all three models fail to predict every crisis in the sample with at least 50 percent probability, and the average probability of missing the signal is around 80 percent.
The bubble theory seems to be more successful in explaining and predicting the occurrence of crises. Abnormally high volatility in stock returns and high volatility in the domestic interest rate spread lead crises by three months and one month, respectively, and the model predicts the occurrence of the 1884 and the 1901 crises with at least 50 percent probability. Both crises were associated with exceptional stock market disturbances due to sales of U.S. securities by British financial institutions (see Sprague, pp. 108-13 and Friedman and Schwartz, pp. 100-101) and to the collapse of Northern Pacific stock (see Friedman and Schwartz, p. 149). In all other episodes, however, the predictive ability of the model is very low.
The visual superiority of model 4 which emerges from Figure 1 is also supported by a formal examination of its predictive ability. Model 4 is better according to all but one forecasting diagnostic. It has the lowest QPS, the highest AL, the lowest number of incorrect cases, and the second lowest GBS statistic. In addition, the average probability of missing the signal drops below 70 percent.
Since the first two theories predict that crises are more likely to occur at particular points of the seasonal and of the business cycle, it is worthwhile to examine whether the predictive content of the first two models improves when specific seasonal and cyclical indicators are used. Table 2 presents the results obtained when the regressors are (i) either seasonal dummies or (ii) the seasonal components of excess cash reserves (Excash Seas), of the deposit to currency ratio (DC Seas), of the number of clearings in New York (ClearNY Seas), and of the international spread between short-term rates (Spreadl Seas) or (iii) the cyclical components of pig iron production (Pigiron Cyc) and of the spread between the bond and the commercial rates (Spread2 Cyc). The seasonal component of each series is constructed by taking the predicted value of a regression of the series on twelve dummies. Cyclical components are computed as the residuals of a regression of the detrended level of the variables on twelve seasonal dummies.5 I find that the probability of crises is seasonal. For both crisis series several dummies are significant and the ones for May and August have the highest explanatory power. However, the predictive ability of a seasonal dummy model is low (except perhaps for the 1884 crisis). A similar result holds when the seasonal component of the excess cash reserves in New York banks, of the deposit-to-currency ratio, of the number of clearings in New York, and of the international interest rate spreads are used as independent variables in the regression. When I examine the explanatory power of cyclical indicators Table 2 spread lagged three months is significant for the second crisis series. None of the cyclical components is significant for the first crisis series and the forecasting ability of this model is very unsatisfactory. To further examine the merits of the seasonal hypothesis I also checked whether the level of either the D/C ratio or the excess cash reserves of New York banks or their unexpected movements (constructed as the recursive residuals of univariate AR(13) regressions) in a particular month of the year are important in explaining movements in the probability of crises. I find that there is a monthly specific effect in the D/C ratio but that the forecasting ability of all models used is poor.
From the results obtained so far several conclusions can be drawn. First, there are variables that are significant in revealing economic conditions conducive to crises. Second, while the seasonal cycle may have some role in explaining the probability of crises, all the cyclical indicators I used provide no information on the probability of a crisis. Third, the earliest signs for the presence of those disturbances that may lead to crises appear in the level of stock market returns and their volatility. Fourth, since measures of recursive volatility of the spread of domestic interest rates show abnormal behavior in at least two crises, the results contradict the finding of Gorton (1989) that crises were systematic, in the sense that a set of statistical relationships need not hold at every date in the sample. Fifth, since in none of the regressions performed does the D/C ratio, its unexpected movements, or its seasonal component act as a leading indicator for crises, it is unlikely that crises were induced by runs on banks. Rather, bank runs seemed to be the endogenous outcome of a fall in public confidence following the outburst of a crisis. Finally, the evidence also suggests that crises were not all statistically alike and that their generation mechanisms differed. While some crises were predictable, in other occasions no variable was capable of explaining or predicting the degeneration of stringencies into financial crises. This last result, however, may obtain simply because there are only few crisis dates in a sample with 408 observations (8 or 15 depending on what crises series is used). That is, models may be unable to predict outliers simply because outliers with similar features are too infrequent in the sample.
To overcome this problem I employ an alternative forecasting technique, originally developed in duration analysis (see Lancaster 1979) and recently popularized in macroeconomics by Diebold and Rudebush (1990) . The basic element of the technique is the hazard function of the data which measures the conditional probability that a crisis occurs at t, given that it has not exploded earlier and that the last crisis ended t-s periods ago. Therefore, the hazard function provides a convenient tool to determine whether crises could have been predicted using the information contained in the historical spans of time elapsed between crises.
The derivative of the hazard function with respect to time provides a formal measure of the duration dependence of the phenomena. If the hazard function displays positive duration dependence, the probability that a crisis will explode increases with the length of time elapsed from the last crisis. If the hazard function displays no duration dependence (that is, if the derivative of the hazard function with respect to time is constant), the spells of time between crises have no pattern, and the infor-mation contained in the spells cannot be used to forecast when the next crisis will occur. By conditioning on the minimum duration of a spell, we can also reexamine the seasonal and the cyclical theory of crises from an alternative point of view. If positive duration dependence emerges once we condition on a minimum duration of twelve or, say, twenty-four to sixty months, this constitutes evidence that crises may have been seasonal or cyclical in nature. To test if the hazard function displays any duration dependence, I employ a nonparametric technique developed by Shapiro and Wilk (1972) and modified by Stephens (1983) to account for the minimum duration of the spells. The technique is powerful since an exact small sample distribution exists even for samples with only three observations. Therefore inference is not conditional on unwarranted asymptotic statements. Table 3 repoxts the p-values of the tes* when the hazard function is constructed recursively. That is, for each q = 4, . . . 8, the test assesses if the information contained in the previous q-l spells helps to predict when the next crisis will occur. In all but one case and for both crisis series, the null hypothesis of no-durationdependence is not rejected. Only when we condition on the information that there must be a twenty-eight-month or longer minimum delay between crises, is the hypothesis of no-duration-dependence rejected. Particularly significant and consistent with previous results is the nonrejection of the null hypothesis of no-durationdependence when the minimum duration is assumed to be twelve months. Therefore, even though the probability of crises may be seasonal, this information is not useful to forecast any of the last five crises in the sample.
Finally, I address the question of whether agents, endowed with the econometric techniques used in the paper, could have avoided wealth losses associated with crises. Consider for this purpose the following simple 50 percent cut-off rule to guide poxtfolio investments: if the probability of a crisis is less than 50 percent, invest 100 percent of wealth in risky assets. If the probability of a crisis is greater than 50 percent, invest 100 percent of wealth in riskless assets. With this portfolio strategy, agents would have been able to cut their losses only in the 1884 and 1901 crises using model 4. To quantify the gains obtained from this strategy it is necessary to have a measure of the riskless rate. Given the structure of financial markets of the period such a rate does not appear to exist. The time rate is the closest substitute of a riskless rate and it is used here as a benchmark riskless asset. Over the 1880-1914 period, the average expost excess return of a strategy that switches from a stock market index to time deposits when a crisis is predicted with at least 50 percent probability relative to a buy-and-hold strategy in a stock market index would have been 0.03 percent.7 This excess return is minuscule when compared, for example, 6 . The values of the table are linearly interpolated from the tables of Shapiro and Wilk. Since there is evidence that seasonal indicators may help to explain the probability of crisis, it may be possible that the hazard function shifts with the season making the analysis invalid. I am unable to verify this hypothesis, since, once I condition on the season, there are less than three observations per cell and the Shapiro and Wilk test cannot be applied. However, in a regression of the durations on seasonal dummies, none of the coefficients on the dummies was significant.
7. The magnitude of the gains is robust and independent of which of the three available rates (time, commercial, or bond rate) is used in the calculation. the durations (q-I iS the number of spells used to predict when the qth crisis will occur). Crisis I is a dummy series with a I when a crisis is in progress. Crisis 2 is a dummy series with a I when a crisis is in progress.
with the average costs of bank failures during crises as reported, for example, by Calomiris and Gorton (1991) . Although more conservative cut-off probabilities (for example, switch when a probability of a crisis is 10 percent) would certainly yield more favorable results as the loss function becomes more asymmetric, it is clear that the unpredictable nature of financial crises casts doubts on the ability of simple investment strategies to shield agents living in the National Banking Era from wealth losses associated with crises. This paper empirically investigates the nature of financial crises in the United States for the period 1880-1914. It is shown that there were variables known to agents one month before the explosion of a crisis that were significant in explaining the economic conditions conducive to crises, that the probability of crises was seasonal, and that business cycle events had little effect on the probability of crises. Despite these "in-sample" findings, the out-of-sample forecasting ability of every model examined was poor. The only exception was a model including measures of volatility of financial aggregates as independent variables that predicted that in 1884 and 1901 the crises with at least 50 percent probability.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, movements in financial variables typically associated with money market stringency and financial market weakness (an increase in short-term interest rates, a drop in asset prices, a sharp reduction in banks' excess cash reserves) appear to be relevant to predict some of the crises in the sample. On at least two occasions agents could have avoided some of the wealth losses using available information and simple forecasting rules. In the six other occasions, however, the signals given by financial and monetary markets were not sufficient to accurately predict the outburst of a crisis. To explain these episodes one therefore has to rely on the occurrence of an extraordinary event not captured by the forecasting model or on the presence of self-fulfilling expectations. Second, while measures of financial market volatility are useful in predicting two crises, in no occasion do variations in the deposit-to-currency ratio act as a leading indicator for crises. Therefore, it unlikely that bank runs "caused" financial crises. Instead, bank runs were probably the endogenous outcome of severe disturbances in financial markets. Third, given the various degree of predictability of different crises, it is unlikely that the mechanism generating the eight crises in the sample was the same.
Two caveats need to be mentioned before embracing these conclusions. One concerns the nature of the data. The monthly average series that are available are not entirely appropriate because they tend to smooth out those outliers that could be useful in predicting the occurrence of crises. Ideally, in conducting these exercises :;
.
one would like to have point-in-time data for all the series. The second concern involves the sampling interval used. A month may be too long an interval of time to predict the occurrence of certain crises. Since the earlier crises included in the sample lasted less than a month, the sampling of the variables of interest may be too infrequent to produce an adequate forecasting model. A study using weekly data is therefore necessary to cross-validate the conclusions obtained in this paper. 
